The Yogācāra's Criticism of the Representative Theory of Perception

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa gives a lucid account of the subjective idealism of the Yogācāra in Nyāyamañjarī. He outlines the following arguments of the Yogācāra against the Sautrāntika doctrine of

Firstly, it may be asked why we should admit the reality of ideas alone, since we do perceive external objects which are quite unlike our ideas. The Yogārāca replies that the existence of external objects cannot be proved. He asks : What do we perceive in the per- ception of the so-called external object? It is either the form of the internal cognition, or the form of the external object, or both. If we perceive both the forms—the form of the cognition representing the form of the object— realism is established. If we perceive only the form of the cognition which does not represent the form of the object, subjective idealism is established. The Yogācāra holds that only one form is manifested to consciousness in the perception of an object, and it is the form of a cognition. It cannot be the form of an object, since the object is material and unconscious, and cannot manifest itself. It can be manifested to consciousness only through a cognition. It cannot be apprehended except through the form of a cognition. Thus the forms of cognitions must be admitted. What, then, is the use of admitting the reality of external objects ? The forms of cognitions serve our purpose. The hypothesis of external objects is gratuitous. The parsimony of hypotheses demands that we should recognize the reality of cognitions alone with their various forms and determinations.

If the realist contends that the cognized object itself is the apprehending cognition, and appears as conscious- ness, there is only a verbal difference between the realist and the subjective idealist. ¹ The realist holds that the object breaks up into subject and object while the Yogācāra holds that the consciousness breaks up into subject and object. Both of them identify the subject (cognition) with the object and abolish all distinction between them. The realist may argue that there is a difference between the percipient cognition and the perceptible object inasmuch as the former is internal and the latter is external. ² But this is wrong. The externality of the object means its externality to the cognition, and not its externality to the body. The object is external in the sense that it is extra-mental, and not in the sense that it is extra-organic. But if the realist admits that the percipient cognition is not other than the perceptible object, the object cannot be regarded as external to the cognition. It cannot be extra-mental because it is nothing but the cognition itself. ³ Thus there is no real difference between realism and subjective idealism.

Hence the Yogācāra concludes that there is no external world. There is no dispute as to the existence of cognitions. But the existence of external objects is open to controversy. Besides, external objects require cognitions to manifest or apprehend them. So, for the sake of parsimony of hypotheses, we must admit the existence of cognitions only, but not of external objects. The forms of cognitions are not due to the forms of external objects ; they are determinations of conscious- ness itself. ¹

Secondly, the realist admits that a cognition manifests an unconscious object which cannot manifest itself. ² So he must admit that a cognition cannot appre- hend an object until the cognition itself is first apprehended, even as a luminous lamp cannot manifest other objects, without itself being first perceived. As soon as a cognition is produced by an object it must be apprehended, for nothing stands in the way of apprehen- sion of the cognition. It does not depend upon any other manifestation, since cognition itself is self-luminous like a lamp. ³ Hence as soon as a cognition is produced it must apprehend itself. If a cognition is not apprehended at the time of its production, it can never be apprehended at some other time because it will remain the same and not acquire any new character by virtue of which it will be apprehended at some other time. If the cognition is said to be apprehended at some other time by another cognition, that cognition, again, will require another cognition to apprehend it and so on, and thus will lead to infinite regress. If the cognition of an object be not apprehended, the object which is manifested by the cognition can never be apprehended. Hence the realist must admit that there is apprehension of a cognition before there can be apprehension of an object. ⁴ So it is said that an object cannot be perceived unless its cognition is apprehended. ⁵

It is a fact of experience that sometimes we apprehend an object and then reflect upon this apprehension. We have a reflective consciousness of the cognition of an object such as “ this object is known by me “. This is a secondary cognition of the simple apprehension of an object. A qualified object cannot be known unless its qualifying adjuncts are known. The apprehension that “ this object is known by me “ presupposes apprehension of the cognition. This clearly shows that a cognition must be apprehended before an object can be apprehended. ¹

Thirdly, the cognition which is apprehended before its object is apprehended, must have a definite form, since a formless cognition can never be apprehended. And if cognitions were devoid of forms, they would never lead to different reactions. Even if we admit the existence of external objects, we cannot but admit the existence of definite forms of cognitions. Otherwise we can never explain how different cognitions should apprehend different objects. ² Cognitions, in their essence, are all alike ; they are of the nature of consciousness. They differ from one another only in their forms or modes. If cognitions were formless and indeterminate, every cognition would be able to apprehend all objects without any distinction. But, as a matter of fact, different cognitions apprehend different objects. For example, the cognition of blue apprehends the blue object. Why should it apprehend only the blue object to the exclusion of all other objects, though it is produced in the presence of many other objects ? The reason is obvious. It is endowed with a definite form by virtue of which it can apprehend only a blue object. If it were not so, it would not always be followed by the same reaction. It cannot be argued that the cognition of blue apprehends the blue object because it is produced by it. In that case, the cognition of blue should apprehend the imperceptible sense-organs also which produce it. But this is not the case. Hence we must admit that there is a definite form of the cognition of blue by virtue of which it apprehends only a blue object and leads to the same reaction. The Yogācāra goes further and holds that there is no external object other than the apprehending cognition with a definite form. The form is inherent in the cognition itself, and not in an external object. ¹

Fourthly, the Yogācāra criticizes the Sautrāntika doctrine that external objects are inferred from our cognitions which are impressed with the forms of the objects. Consciousness, which is formless and indeter- minate in itself, is modified in different ways by external objects, even as a crystal, which is transparent by nature, is coloured by its contact with lac. The different forms of consciousness are produced by the different external objects which are inferred from them. ²

The Yogācāra urges that this argument is wrong. Even if we suppose that cognitions have definite forms in the presence of their objects, we never perceive formless and indeterminate cognitions in the absence of objects. The method of difference cannot be applied here. The method of agreement cannot yield a certain conclusion unless it is supplemented by the method of difference. The Sautrāntika cannot, therefore, legitimately conclude that the forms of cognitions are produced by the forms of external objects. ³

Further, the analogy of crystal and lac is not appropriate. The crystal, which is by nature transparent, assumes a red colour when it comes in contact with lac. But we never perceive an indeterminate cognition which assumes a definite form in contact with an object. We perceive the natural transparence of crystal, the red colour of lac, and the colour of the crystal as modified by its red colour. But we never perceive a formless and indeterminate cognition before it assumes the form of an object, nor the form of the object as distinct from the form of the ition. ¹

There cannot be two forms, the form of cognition as well as the form of the object, since we are not conscious of them. The assumption of two forms will lead to infinite regress. If both the form of the object and the form of its cognition produced by it are perceived, the former will be perceived by a determinate cognition with a definite form. And this determinate cognition, again, being the object of apprehension, will be perceived by another determinate cognition, and so on. If the form of the object is said to be apprehended by a determinate cognition which is self-luminous and apprehends itself without depending upon any other determinate cognition, it is needless to assume the existence of the form of the object as distinct from the self-luminous determinate cognition because it is never manifested to consciousness. If the determinate cognition itself is said to be an object, there is only a verbal difference between realism and idealism. In fact, cognitions themselves should be regarded as endowed with the forms of blue and the like. The hypo- thesis of external objects is needless and unwarranted. ²

Fifthly, if it be argued that consciousness in itself is formless and indeterminate, and consequently its determinations and modifications must be due to some other cause, the Yogācāra replies that the determinations of consciousness are caused by subconscious impressions due to avidya (nescience). The variety in the modes or determinations of consciousness is due to the variety of subconscious impressions originating in a beginningless series of avidyā. ³ Cognitions (jñāna) and subconscious impressions (vāsanā) are connected with each other as causes and effects, like seeds and sprouts, forming an unending series. Hence it is needless to assume the existence of inferrible external objects to account for the variety of determinate cognitions, since it can be easily explained by the variety of subconscious impressions within the stream of consciousness itself. The so-called external objects are nothing but the forms or determina- tions of consciousness itself. ¹

Sixthly, we distinctly apprehend cognitions without external objects in dreams, illusions, hallucinations, recollections, and the like. These are subjective forms of cognitions without any external objects corresponding to them. ² Hence it is established that the forms or deter- minations of consciousness are inherent in the cognitions themselves, and not due to the forms of external objects. It cannot be said that the form (ākāra) is neither inherent in the object, nor in the cognition, but arises out of the relationship of the cognition with the object. If we first perceived a formless object separately, then a formless cognition separately, and at last the form of the cognition and the form of the object coming into relationship with each other, then only we would be able to say that the form of the cognition arises out of the relationship of the cognition with its object. But this is not the usual order of our experience. So the form of a cognition cannot be said to be due to the relationship of the cognition with its object. It is admitted by all that dreams and similar states are determinate cognitions independent of external objects. Our waking perceptions are on the same footing with dreams and the like. They also are determinate cognitions independent of external objects.