ABSTRACT
Given the ubiquitous underutilization of labour as well as excess agro-industrial capacity in non-socialist Third World countries, it seems reasonable to conclude that any increase in aggregate demand would stimulate some economic growth. Military budgets during the 1960s tended to be markedly higher for Third World countries involved in “belligerency” than for others. Opportunity costs were only marginally affected by economic development levels, although these tended to increase for education among the more developed countries while they declined for the least developed which may have been impacted more by foreign aid programmes. In many instances the tradeoffs appeared to be more pronounced with private consumption and investment than with civil government expenditures unless military burdens were relatively high. Yet even the sacrifice of investment which is essential to future productivity bodes ill for development aspirations, while all of the tradeoffs and the concomitant growth of repressive militarism serve to perpetuate the structural violence endemic to these areas.
