Military space

The Soviet strategic environment and military force structure is the end product of various interrelated factors that have occurred during over 1,000 years of repeated brutal historical experiences, and related geographical, political, and cultural factors. ¹ Geographically, Russia and later the Soviet Union have occupied a centralized ‘heartland’ pivotal position that lends itself potentially both to dominating the peripheral Eurasian landmass and invasion from surrounding enemies. The impact of the Mongol invasion and occupation of Russia in the thirteenth century was fundamental in shaping subsequent Russian political structures because of its imposition of a non-European political style. While western Europe was experiencing the Renaissance and the Reformation and the emergence of democratic ideals, Russia was under the heel of an Asiatic military autocracy. After the overthrow of the 200-year-old Mongol domination, Muscovite Russia proceeded in turn to dominate neighbouring states (for example Georgians, Armenians, and nations in Central Asia and in the Baltic Area). Through the Russian Orthodox Church, Moscow was characterized as the ‘Third Rome’. The Tsars fostered a tradition of militarism and strict autocratic government which was encouraged by foreign invasions such as that of Napoleon’s Grand Army in 1812. History taught the Russians a clear lesson: their survival depended upon the acquisition and use of military power. In the twentieth century this Russian tradition of militarism, autocratic government, and fear of foreign invasion has been strengthened by the tragic results of the two World Wars and the Bolshevik Revolution. The Soviet Union of today is in many respects an imperial power with an overlay of Communist ideology with global pretensions. The technically advanced west, and in particular the United States, is its main current uncontrolled adversary. The Soviets recognize that Eastern Europe must be held at any cost as a buffer zone against potential enemies from the west. In this regard, there is an underlying Soviet fear of the re-emergence of a re-unified Germany as a world power. China is perceived as a secondary threat, technologically inferior, but with a serious security potential if militarily and technologically bolstered by the United States and Japan.