ABSTRACT
This chapter is concerned with Hume’s attempt to explain what we are really thinking of when we think we are conceiving or perceiving a vacuum. On one interpretation, he held that we perceive an “invisible and intangible distance” distinct both from a filled distance and from a vacuum. On another, he held that we perceive vacuum the way Berkeley maintained we perceive visual depth: all we directly experience are purely qualitative “cues” that lead us to imagine a distance that we judge must be present, even though it is not immediately perceived. This chapter argues that the Berkeleian interpretation is superior, but that Hume’s case for denying that we can perceive and conceive vacua between visible and tactile points fails on either interpretation. This is a fortuitous outcome because, on either interpretation, Hume allowed that sensations of colour and touch need not be disposed in space. That would have been a dangerous concession to Reid.
