ABSTRACT
This chapter does two things. First, it argues that Aristotle’s ethical system is open to addition. This is because Aristotle acknowledged nameless virtues and vices, and he privileged experience and practicality in his ethics. Practical disciplines must adapt. Second, this chapter lays out Aristotle’s two core ethical concepts: happiness (eudaimonia) and virtue (aretē). Aristotle defines happiness as an entire life lived well—a life according to reason and virtue, where one also has access to sufficient somatic goods (such as health and beauty) and external goods (such as wealth, reputation, and justice). Aristotle defines virtues as dispositions to act, think, and feel well, where universal emotions or situations in life are relevant, which affect whether someone can achieve happiness. Having set up Aristotle’s system, the chapter closes with the idea that Aristotle’s traditional virtues cannot tell us why he judged some instances of play as ethical and some as unethical. And it hints that Aristotle’s open system should add another virtue to explain play’s various ethical evaluations, namely the virtue of playfulness.
