ABSTRACT
The flawed structure of the Russian state is at root of the difficult economic and political relationship between the centre and the regions. But it is true that at least two republics, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, have negotiated particular financial privileges, while all have enjoyed greater freedom to develop their own sometimes idiosyncratic political systems. As with the Federation Treaty, the constitution's compromises only perpetuated the rivalry between the republics and the regions, because it refined rather than reformed the asymmetrical federal system. Tatarstan retained the right that it had claimed in 1991–92 to run its own fiscal affairs, while remitting an agreed portion of its tax revenue to the centre. The treaties established the practice of individual bargaining, often with Yeltsin himself, as the main vehicle for the conduct of regional relations with the centre. The constitutional basis of post-Soviet Russia evolved as series of compromises reached amid continuous political crisis, and as a result contains two underlying weaknesses.
