ABSTRACT
India's nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 caught the world unawares. While there were many reasons for dismay, there was little cause for surprise. Pakistan had adopted a similar policy of ambiguity at around the same time as India Unofficial statements vaunting the country's nuclear capabilities had been made under successive governments and, once out of office, former prime ministers had dropped strong hints that Islamabad possessed nuclear weapons. The international debate which preceded the tests revolved around three main options: first, renouncing the option of possessing nuclear weapons by adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; second, maintaining an 'existential deterrent', which provided a degree of military security, without entailing high risks or significant international disapproval; or third, establishing an overt nuclear capability and an effective and credible deterrent. India has long aspired to be in the front rank of global political powers, and has several attributes to support its bid.
