Ethnography and Realism

In this chapter I want to discuss some of the philosophical underpinnings of ethnographic research. For some ethnographers such a discussion may seem irrelevant at best. There is a strong anti-philosophical strand in ethnographic thinking that places value on the practice and products of research and has little patience with or interest in discussions about research. ¹ I have some sympathy with this. Philosophical discussion and debate can easily become a distraction; a swapping of one set of problems for another, probably even less tractable, set. Certainly, I do not believe that philosophy is foundational, in the sense that the problems in that realm can or should be resolved before we engage in social research. Indeed, in my view empirical research, accompanied by reflection on its practice and products, has much to contribute to philosophy. But there is no escape from philosophical assumptions for researchers. Whether we like it or not, and whether we are aware of them or not, we cannot avoid such assumptions. And, sometimes, the assumptions that we make lead us into error. I believe that this is the case with some of the epistemological ideas current amongst ethnographers. These ideas are my concern in this chapter.