ABSTRACT
The basic dilemma of Bismarckian foreign policy in this period was how to maintain good relations between Russia and Austria while ensuring that both of them were well disposed towards, and dependent on, Germany. Failure to satisfy either of these two powers could result in the formation of a coalition, which would inevitably include France, directed against Germany. For the sake of Germany’s security, Bismarck was impelled to perform a delicate balancing act in order to placate Russia while offering some reassurance to Austria. The issue most likely to generate tension between the two powers was, of course, a revival of the Eastern Question. If a serious crisis arose in the Balkans, Germany, which had no direct interests of its own in this part of the decaying Ottoman empire, had to avoid being pressured into siding with either the Russians or the Austrians. But both powers regarded Berlin’s support on Balkan issues as the acid test of German goodwill. This was a dilemma from which there was no real escape. The problem consequently remained a persistent, if latent, threat to the security of the German empire.
