Hy ster ias, anxieties and many other con ditions of the mind follow naturally upon our discussions upon dreams, because what the dream is to the sleeper the nervous disease is to the waking life in many respects. The nightmare of sleep corresponds on the whole to the anxiety condition of the waking neurotic individual. In other words, the neurotic is living in a kind of dream. The most absurd dream may be quite real during sleep, because it is split off from our conscious experience. Thus a man may fall off a cliff 300 feet high in a dream and alight comfortably and without any sense of surprise in an armchair at the bottom of the cliff, because his conscious judg ment about falling is split off from his dream experience. In hysteria a similar splitting of consciousness takes place. Our study of dreams, then, will have enabled us to understand much more readily our functional diseases. They are pathological conditions of the mind in which the absurdity of the situation as gauged by our
reasoning faculties is largely left in abeyance —not by any deliberate and conscious effort, but for the simple reason that our identity is split into two or more portions, a gap lying between the conscious and the unconscious reasoning and conclusions, and this gulf remains quite unbridgeable until analysed. This ex planation applies to certain forms of hysteria and lunacy: it does not apply equally to all so-called functional diseases, for though some of the functional diseases are occasioned by a gap or a splitting off of consciousness in ideas (ideals, memories, conflicts), others are the result of accumulated emotions attendant upon these ideas, and one must always remember that the emotions are of a primary nature and occur before any reasoning is applied thereto. Thus while we may recognise that erotic emotions connected with human beings follow upon definite ideas of beauty or other attractions, in our primitive ancestors we must recognise emotions as something felt prior to deliberate or reasoned ideas. One cannot imagine that the earthworm, an organism without eyes and with ganglia representing the primitive brain, has any particular ideas in connection with another earthworm; but it can be imagined that it has a compelling energy of emotionnot connected with definite ideas-which causes
it to come into contact with another earthworm, to desire touch, and so forth, without a reasoned idea lying behind as motive. There is, in other words, a stage in development in which emotions per se become emotions attached to a mental picture or idea. We must therefore divide our psychic diseases
into two classes: those connected with ideas with their attendant emotions, and those chiefly concerned with emotions themselves, whether in reality they have ideas attached to them or not. Broadly speaking, the division is as follows:— 1. The Psycho-Neuroses: These are neurotic
conditions following repressed ideas. 2. The Actual Neuroses: Those dependent
upon accumulated emotions whether ideas are there in a subsidiary form or not.