ABSTRACT
According to Kumārila, an act of cognition cannot be directly perceived; it is inferred from cognizedness (jñātatā) or manifestness (prākaṭya) produced by the cognition in the object. According to some Mīmāṁsakas, the act of cognition is inferred from the consciousness of its object; it is not an object of perception. According to Prabhākara, a cognition is directly perceived by itself; every cognition perceives itself, the cognizing self and the cognized object. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a cognition is an object of perception; but it is not perceived by itself but by another cognition through the internal organ or mind; we perceive a cognition by internal perception through the mind, just as we perceive an external object by external perception through the external senses. According to the Jaina, a cognition is perceived by itself in apprehending its object; it is not perceived by any other cognition. According to the Buddhist idealist, a cognition is self-luminous; it apprehends itself but not an external object as there is no such object; a cognition is not apprehended by the self because there is no self at all. According to the Sāṁkhya-Pātañjala, a cognition is not perceived by another cognition but by the self because a cognition is unconscious. According to Śaṁkara, a cognition is not perceived by another cognition but by itself; it is self-luminous.
