ABSTRACT
Can the Ātman or self be perceived? This question has been answered in different ways by different schools of Indian Philosophers. The Cārvāka holds that there is no self at all, and it can neither be perceived nor inferred. The Buddhist idealist recognizes the distinction of subject and object only within consciousness. He does not recognize any permanent self apart from the ever-changing stream of consciousness. The Naiyāyika recognizes the self as a substance endowed with the qualities of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort. Some earlier Naiyāyikas hold that the self can never be an object of perception; it is known by an act of inference from its qualities. The Vaiśeṣika, too, is of the same opinion. But he admits that the self can be object of yogic intuition. The Sāṁkhya holds that the self is an object of inference; it is inferred as an original (bimba) from its reflection (pratibimba) in buddhi. The Pātañjala holds that the self can be an object of higher intuition (prātibha-jñāna). The Neo-Naiyāyika holds that the self is an object of internal perception (mānasapratyakṣa); it can be perceived only through the mind in relation to its distinctive qualities. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka also holds that the self is an object of internal perception or self-consciousness (ahaṁpratyaya).
