ABSTRACT
Like all empirical disciplines social anthropology rests upon statements on observation—not just any statements, but relevant ones: relevant, naturally, as regards the kind of thing we are interested in; and relevant also as regards the use we wish to make of our observations. The former relevance follows from the nature of our enquiry, which is concerned with social and cultural phenomena and not, for example, with physical and physiological ones. The second relevance is defined by the two aims with which social (like any other) enquiry may be carried out—the aim of description, or of explanation. This distinction somewhat oversimplifies the position and will have to be re-examined later on; but let it pass for the moment. Description presents things or events as though they were immediate data of observation; 26 it presents them, further, as ‘just-so’ existing, and existing in a particular form. Explanation works upon the immediate data and presents them as already elaborated; it adds meaning to ‘just-so’ existence, that is, it subsumes the particular under a general order. Full scientific insight is insight into an order of things, and full scientific knowledge, knowledge of general validity. Science, then, implies explanation. Social anthropology is a science only to the extent to which it can explain.
