ABSTRACT
Voluntary Association.—Much personal and individual effort has been directed during the last hundred years towards the amelioration of social and economic conditions. Part of it has been of the nature of charitable assistance. Private philanthropy has created innumerable benevolent agencies, voluntary hospitals, homes for orphan children and for aged and infirm persons, institutions for the physically and mentally afflicted, religious, reformatory and rescue societies, associations for the improvement of the poor, &c. The sums handled by these charitable organizations are impossible to calculate. Since 1853, endowed charities in England have been supervised by four Charity Commissioners, who have at present in their charge about 80,000 charities with endowments of over £80 millions. Much of this voluntary effort, on the other hand, has been of the nature of self-help and has led to the foundation of mutual-aid associations like trade unions and co-operative, friendly and building societies. It is significant that men tend to act collectively in these matters. The part played by the principle of association in the modern world has become very important. It is almost true to say that hardly a vestige remains of the individualist organization of society presupposed by the early economists. For nearly all purposes, social, religious, economic and recreational, men do not act as individuals but as members of groups. In the economic sphere, this tendency is very noticeable. A man’s economic position is determined, not by his own bargaining power, but by that of the economic group to which he belongs. If he is a worker, he joins a trade union, if an employer, an employers’ federation, if a professional man, some organization like the British Medical Association, the National Union of Teachers, the Inns of Court or the Stock Exchange. Hence the attitude of the law towards associations has a very important influence on economic activity. Originally the courts took the narrow view that an association had no legal existence unless it was ‘incorporated’ by the Crown or by Act of Parliament. Moreover, every corporation was strictly bound in its powers by the terms of its charter and could do nothing which was not authorized therein. In the course of the nineteenth century, this pedantic attitude had to be modified. A host of associations grew up spontaneously, which were not ‘incorporated’ but which held property and entered into contracts. It was very awkward that these could not sue or be sued in the law courts, since the law did not recognize their existence. To meet this difficulty, the judges developed the fiction of ‘representative action’, by which an unincorporated association could sue or be sued in name of one or more of its officers or members. This was an important concession. It implied that what were in effect corporations could grow up spontaneously without being specifically authorized by the Crown or the legislature. But the judges did not mean to allow these informal corporations more liberty than was enjoyed by those which the law had always recognized. Accordingly every association was held to be bound by some document (e.g. a set of rules) which might be regarded as the equivalent of its charter. The practical difficulties caused by this unbending attitude will find illustration in the history of some of the social movements which we are about to consider.
