ABSTRACT
C o u n t G r a b b é was so satisfied with the immediate result of his efforts that he thought little of Shamil’s escape. Indeed, the price he set upon the fugitive’s head was no more than Rs. 300 (Æ30).1 But the Emperor Nicholas, who followed closely the affairs of the Caucasus and sometimes saw farther than either his Ministers or his generals, was not without misgivings. On the margin of Grabbé’s report on the taking of Akhoulgó he wrote with his own hand: “ Very good, but it’s a pity that Shamil escaped, and I confess to fearing fresh intrigues on his part, notwithstanding that, without a doubt, he has lost the greater part of his means and of his influ ence. We must see what happens next.” 2
The state of things in Tchetchnia, however, during the
winter months of 1839-40 seemed amply to justify even Grabbé’s optimism. By his orders General Pullo in December and again in January marched through the greater part of Lower Tchetchnia, meeting no resistance. On the con trary the Tchetchens for once seemed thoroughly cowed ; they accepted without a murmur the conditions imposed by the Russian commander, gave up outlaws, surrendered a few Russian deserters and prisoners, handed over a considerable number of muskets, and even received with honour the preestaffs now appointed to govern them. Grabbé complacently attributed this marvellous change to his success at Akhoulgó, and reported both to Golóvine and to the War Minister in St. Petersburg the re-establish ment of absolute peace in the whole country. “ Although we have not succeeded in taking Shamil, yet the death or capture of all his adherents, his own shameful flight, and the terrible lesson read to those tribes which supported him, have deprived him of all influence and reduced him to such a condition that, wandering alone in the mountains, he must think only of the means of subsistence and his own personal safety. The Murid sect has fallen, with all its adherents and followers.” Dealing, moreover, with the plan of operations for 1840, he wrote : “ Considering the present position of affairs in Daghestan and Tchetchnia it is highly probable that the expeditionary forces will meet no resistance, and that the building/ of the fort at Tchirkéi will be accomplished without the necessity of fighting. In Tchetchnia no serious unrest, no general rising, need be anticipated.” 1 The intention had been to build two forts only, at Tchirkéi and Gherzel aoul. Grabbé proposed now to add a third
at Datcha-Barzoi, at the entrance to the lowest defile of the river Argoun, thus initiating the construction of the so-called Tchetchen advanced line, VeliameenofFs third parallel. But as it turned out, only one of the forts was built-at Gherzel aoul-and the spring had not set in when all Tchetchnia was once more up in arms. The Russians indeed played into Shamil’s hands in a way that even he could hardly have anticipated. Pullo was a brave and skilful officer, but, as characterised by General Galaféyeff and by Grabbé himself, he was a man of most cruel nature,1 and what that must have meant in the Caucasus we can well imagine. He was, moreover, quite unscrupulous. The Tchetchens feared and hated him, and when, failing to find Russians sufficiently acquainted with the native language to fill the office of preestaff, he proceeded to appoint renegade natives, who treated those subordinated to them with shameful cruelty and injustice, the measure of their patience was soon filled. Discontent grew rife, and when the rumour spread-whether set about by the disaffected natives themselves or invented by the preestaffs for their own ends-that the Tchetchens were to be disarmed, converted into peasants on the Russian pattern and subjected to conscription, it only wanted a spark to set the whole country once more in a blaze; the people were ripe for action ; there lacked but a leader — and Shamil was at hand.2
