ABSTRACT
The US-Pakistan Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement signed in May 1954 reinforced Washington’s ability to persuade Karachi to do things considered important by US policymakers. Washington and Taipei appeared to have reached a compromise by agreeing on reducing the profile of covert operations in and around the South China Sea, and focusing on Tibet where the Chinese stake was relatively lower, and Beijing’s ability to retaliate, more limited. Beijing may have sought to neutralise India’s position as an ally of the US in the covert warfare that not only continued in eastern Tibet, but in the mid-1950s, was beginning to spread and challenge the effectiveness of Chinese control over large stretches of the plateau. The Chinese authorities in Tibet had embarked on far-reaching steps to ‘liberate’ the people of Tibet. Perhaps the most significant measure was to build a network of motorable roads linking various parts of the plateau with China proper and with Xinjiang.
