Introduction

On the morning of 22 June 1941 Nazi Germany unleashed a sudden and massive offensive to destroy the Soviet state. The ambitious German undertaking, based on the premise that the bulk of the Soviet Army could be annihilated in the immediate border regions by use of blitzkrieg conducted on a large scale, caught the Soviets only partially prepared for war. Force reconstruction and reequipment programs were underway but incomplete. Although the Soviets had ample warning, for as yet inexplicable reasons, Stalin forbade the Soviet military to take prudent defensive precautions, thus granting the Germans the equivalent of strategic, operational, and tactical surprise. The German hammer blows staggered the Soviet armed forces and almost resulted in their destruction. By Soviet admission:

our pre-war views on the conduct of armed struggle in the initial period of war did not investigate the possibility of the concealed timely deployment and simultaneous action of enemy armed forces on the land, in the air and at sea. Mistakes in theory had a negative effect on resolving the practical questions of covering the state borders and deploying the armed forces which, along with other reasons, caused serious misfortunes in the war.

There were many problems in working out command and control and organizing communications with operational large units. The assertion that the defense found fullest expression only in the realm of army operations was incorrect, as was the view that the struggle for air superiority must be realized on the scale of front and army operations. The complicated views at the beginning of the war concerning the organization of the army and forces of the rear did not fully meet the demands of the theory of deep offensive operations and battle. Operational and forces rear services remained cumbersome and immobile.

There were also serious deficiencies in the theoretical training of commanders and in the combat training of forces …. ¹