ABSTRACT
It is impossible to follow what happened in Northern Malaya unless the theory behind the endless retreats is understood. The British troops were not intended to fight a battle of annihilation. They were fighting in north Malaya, but they were not supposed to defend it to the last man. They formed part of the long-range defence of Singapore, and sooner or later would be needed on the island. They were to defend the aerodromes. If they were driven from the aerodromes, or the positions defending them, then they had to retreat to the next position southwards, imposing delay on the Japanese by careful demolitions, and conserving their own strength. These demands naturally made the British commanders fearful at all times of being surrounded and cut off, and hence liable to retreat before it became absolutely imperative to do so. It left the initiative firmly in the hands of the Japanese. And, of course, all the initial moves were dogged by the in-decisiveness over Matador.
