ABSTRACT
The basic assumption of the paper, signed by the new CIGS, Lieutenant General Archibald Murray, and the First Sea Lord, Admiral Henry Jackson, was that a British evacuation from Gallipoli, or, alternatively, the arrival of German Austrian units in the theatre, would facilitate the transfer of strong Ottoman forces eastward. Based on theoretical calculations of time and space, they determined that should these forces begin moving at the end of November, no fewer than 100,000 Ottoman troops would be massed at the Egyptian border within four months. Murray's estimate of February regarding the 250,000-strong Ottoman force in Palestine was unquestionably highly inflated. This aspect of the MEF's operational appreciation was harshly criticised retrospectively. T. E. Lawrence vilified the exaggerated estimates, which he ascribed to Major Godfrey Holdich, then the la officer in Murray's headquarters, claiming that they were a misrepresentation against the protest of Philip Graves, Jennings Bramley, and I the three active intelligence staff officers.
