An infant is obviously in no position to provide such consent. Either the infant must cease to be regarded as a person or he must constitute an exception to the general rule. To argue that he is not a person is scarcelyacceptable.1 To make him an exception weakens the force of the general rule. Hobbes might well have opted to make him an exception but this he nowhere clearly does. The exclusion of infants from obligatory ties, however, becomes necessary to Hobbes's system since an infant cannot meaningfully consent to authority - whether from fear, prudence or rational conjecture. (If an infant could be obligated without its consent, then we would have a case of rule being based solely upon power - which Hobbes does not, of course, allow.) Infants must then be seen as a category of persons who are controlled but not obligated. (Hobbes views slaves, who are regarded as persons in chains, in precisely this light.)
some human beings are controlled by others with the consent (implied or express) of the controllers' peers, but without the consent of the persons controlled.