ABSTRACT
Vice-Admiral Cunningham had reported Namsos and the adjacent fjords clear of the enemy on 12th April, then proceeding north to rej oin the Commanderin-Chief off the Lofoten Islands, but the troops destined for Namsos could not arrive for some days. Further south, Captain Pegram with the Glasgow„ Sheffield and six destroyers1 was operating in the Aalesund area ; early on 13th April2 he was searching for a pocket battleship, a cruiser and many large merchant ships reported by aircraft the previous day, when he intercepted A.T. 0216/13 addressed to the Commander-in-Chief :—
‘ In order to forestall the Germans at Namsos and to ensure an unopposed landing for a larger force, which will arrive at Namsos [about the 16th] propose, if you see no objection, that Sheffield and Glasgow should each prepare a landing party of about 150 men. A decision as to whether these parties will be required to land should be received by Glasgow and Sheffield about 1500 today (Saturday). Party should have provisions for seven days. Time of landing will be at the discretion of the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. Glasgow. Operation will be called “ Henry ” \
The Commander-in-Chief had ' no objection, as a very temporary measure ; but, as both ships' main armaments will be practically out of action for this period, consider it essential R.A.F. bombers should clear up pocket-battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and 15,000-ton storeship in Molde area \ The Admiralty therefore told Captain Pegram to carry on, and A.T. 1627/13 gave him particular instructions (extract) :—
‘Your object is to secure Namsen Fjord, so that a force of two battalions can be landed, a.m., 17th April. Landing parties should secure quays at Namsos and Bangsund and bridge across River Namsen ; road south from Bangsund to be secured, if possible. Norwegians should be given every encouragement and assistance with rifles and ammunition.
