ABSTRACT

A distinguishing feature of the rentier state, as demonstrated by Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, has been the rise in power of the ruling families at the expense of traditional elites such as merchants and tribal leaders: what Jill Crystal has characterized as a ‘trade of wealth for formal power’. 1 Oman followed a very different pattern whereby the traditional elites actually saw an increase in their political power following the coup of 1970 as state involvement in both economic and social programs increased and the bureaucracy grew. Merchants and the tribal shaikhs were not relegated to the accumulation of wealth: their expertise and loyalty became necessary to the functioning of the state. Of particular note in the development of the state was the extent to which Sultan Qaboos maintained continuity with the ancien régime of his father. Although much richer and much more popular than his father, Sultan Qaboos demonstrated many of the same personal characteristics of Sa’id b. Taimur and through 1996 gathered around him the descendants of his father’s regime.