ABSTRACT
Omani foreign policy has received more attention than any other aspect of the development of the sultanate since 1970 particularly with the publication of Joseph Kechichian’s Oman and the World. 1 Kechichian has provided (pp. 60–63) a most useful chronological framework for an analysis of Omani foreign policy, dividing it into four periods, namely Consolidation (1971–75), Transition (1976–80), Maturation (1981–85) and the Current Period (1986–94), as well as placing foreign policy within its domestic context. What Kechichian has concluded is that the sultanate has adopted a very pragmatic and independent foreign policy. While generally agreeing with Kechichian’s paradigm and drawing extensively on his research, this briefer analysis of Omani foreign policy from 1970 to 1996 will focus more on the specific issues of rhetoric versus reality in the formation of that policy, the residual effect of Oman’s historical legacy of empire, the paternalism of the regime that granted considerable latitude to Sultan Qaboos in formulating foreign policy, and the economic necessities of the sultanate which served to restrict foreign policy independence. What emerged from these factors is a foreign policy that evolved from one focusing on specific Omani strategic concerns to a more global view, increasingly determined by economics, and one which was in theory internationalist but in reality very regionally focused.
