Relevance Theory

We saw in section 3.2.3 of the last chapter how Sperber and Wilson take the recovery of implicatures to proceed by means of non-demonstrative inference. We also saw in that earlier context how these same theorists envisage a central role for deductive reasoning in non-demonstrative inference. ¹ What was not examined in the last chapter, however, is the wider relevance-theoretic framework to which these views of Sperber and Wilson belong. This framework has both cognitive and communicative components. In the sections to follow, we discuss these components on their own terms and with a view to examining the dependence of communication processes on cognitive processes in Sperber and Wilson’s account. At the heart of this examination will be Sperber and Wilson’s key claims that communication is guided by a principle of relevance and that the implicature of an utterance in communication is that proposition which produces the maximum number of contextual implications for the minimum amount of processing effort. These claims are, in part, the focus of a later challenge to relevance theory. This challenge draws upon a similar, but earlier criticism of logical positivism by the philosopher Hilary Putnam. Before examining the details of this criticism and its application to the case of relevance theory, we consider how Sperber and Wilson conceive of the process through which implicatures are recovered in conversation.