ABSTRACT
This chapter analyzes the corruption market of southern Italy, addressing several questions: Have the investigations into political corruption revealed—as many southern politicians would like to think—that "it's the same all over the world"? Do politicians become corrupted in the same way in Milan as in Palermo? The extension of Mafia protection on public contracts tends to stabilize relationships among crime, politics, and business, producing alliances among individual Mafia bosses, politicians, and entrepreneurs. The supply of Mafia guarantees can find interested customers even among corrupted politicians, who in this way receive certification of the reliability of corrupting businesses. The Mafia and corruption can be considered as discrete "businesses," dealing essentially in different commodities: private protection, property rights on political rents. Mafia protection allows a firm to keep dangerous rivals at a distance or acquire other competitive advantages. Mafiosi can also offer their services of violent protection in the more general area of political agreements and exchanges.
