ABSTRACT

China ' s m i l i t a r y exercises i n the T a i w a n Strait i n 1995-96 accentuated con­ cerns a m o n g states i n the Asia-Pacific r eg ion about w h a t k i n d o f great p o w e r Ch ina w i l l become i f i ts economic g r o w t h cont inues at present rates a n d i f i ts domest ic p o l i t i c a l sys tem does n o t change apprec iab ly I n mos t respects m a n y Chinese in t e rna l pos t -mor tems o n the crisis were qui te s i m ­ i la r to those i n other states: coercive d i p l o m a c y l ed to an increase i n vo te r s u p p o r t for Beij ing's nemesis, Lee Teng-hui , a n d i t increased w o r r i e s a m o n g s u r r o u n d i n g states about h o w C h i n a m i g h t hand le b i la te ra l d is ­ putes w i t h t hem; b u t i t also s h o w e d jus t h o w ser iously the Chinese reg ime takes threats to the related interests of t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y a n d domest ic l eg i t imacy . 1

The ques t ion is: to w h a t extent m i g h t China ' s recent coercive d i p l o m a c y be a harb inger of fu ture approaches to r e so lv ing reg iona l conflicts o f in ter­ est, tha t is, to w h a t extent is the T a i w a n issue an aberra t ion, a u n i q u e case that has less relevance for forecasting China ' s confl ic t management behav­ iour? Thus far there is l i t t l e consensus about w h a t the T a i w a n crisis meant , i ndeed o n w h a t China ' s rise as a great p o w e r means for reg iona l and g loba l peace a n d deve lopment . The debate i n the U n i t e d States over the i m p l i c a ­ t ions of "China ' s r i s e " — w h i l e there are those w i t h qu i te set op in ions-is jus t s ta r t ing . This debate, however , lacks sophis t icated analy t ica l f rame­ w o r k s , research a n d evidence, i n pa r t because the C h i n a ques t ion has

Reprinted w i t h the permission of Cambridge University Press. Originally pub­ lished as "China's Mili tarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949-1992: A First Cut at the Data," China Quarterly, No. 153, (1998): 1-30.