ABSTRACT
This chapter investigates how bureaucratic centralization in a large bureaucratic organization in Congress can augment the information-processing capacity of budget decision makers or relieve institutional frictions. Bureaucratic centralization likely improves information-processing capacity of budget decision makers during the executive budget process in the national government. Before the enactment of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (CBA), there were three main committees in Congress, Authorization Committees, Appropriations Committees, and two tax committees. A conventional view of Appropriations Committees, especially the House Appropriations Committee, is somewhat bifurcated. The House Appropriations Committee was the least partisan committee and the norms of specialization and reciprocity dominated appropriations processes. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was created mainly for the purpose of providing Congress with sophisticated budget information and policy analysis. The chapter examines how bureaucratic centralization in Congress affects US budget choices. US budget authorities for the subfunctions include new annual budget authority, permanent budget authority, and other legal authorities to borrow and contract.
