ABSTRACT
The theoretical dispute concerning the right or otherwise of ijtihad was secondary and subordinate to the real and practical issue, which lay in a straightforward clash between conservative and progressive opinion. Those who saw the established law as the ideal order of things upheld the doctrine of taqlid. While those who sought reform argued for the legitimacy of ijtihad as the ultimate and proper means of changing legal rules which rested on the unanimous authority of the mediaeval manuals. Prior to the open and explicit recognition of ijtihad as a juristic basis of reform, a number of changes were effected which combined traditional authorities with wholly novel precepts, and thus represented a mid-way stage between taqlid and ijtihad proper? Even more radical perhaps, in contrast with the preceding Syrian Law, was the Tunisian ijtihad concerning repudiation, where once again reform was based on the views of Muhammad Abduh.
