ABSTRACT
The componential analysis of appraisals offers promise of a "structural emotion theory." Distinguishing one emotion from another was the rationale for K. R. Scherer, for C. A. Smith and Phoebe Ellsworth, and for Michael Frijda, in their analyses of appraisal patterns. The assumption of a causal role of appraisal processes in emotion arousal forms the common ground of theorists stressing the role of emotional appraisal. Appraisal theory also has been often rejected because emotions supposedly occur fast, not allowing time for much information processing. Appraisals are not only emotion antecedents and components, but also consequents. Appraisal by action control processes extends to novelty and unexpectedness: both leave the subject without direct cues for which action to take. Appraisals are part of stored knowledge that is replete with evaluations, recalled actions, and calls to action. Appraisal stabilizes when it has developed so that a given action readiness has emerged and settles in preparation and execution of action.
