ABSTRACT
Among the many problems of legal theory of major importance are those which center around the concept of "legal system". This chapter examines the "pure theory of law" from the viewpoint of an attempt to specify in a precise manner a sense of "legal system" which describes accurately at least one way—perhaps the most important way—in which every legal System may be said to be genuinely systematic. The pure theory of law is misleading insofar as it reduces legal justification to these two kinds: "justification by subsumption", and "justification by delegation". The chapter cites a few passages which indicate Hans Kelsen's theoretical concern with the task of rational reconstruction. Kelsen distinguishes between law and the science of law, or law and jurisprudence. The chapter considers further some "problems of language" in rational reconstruction. Rational reconstruction can be done only in this piecemeal, step-by-step fashion. It begins at the bottom and works its way towards the top.
