ABSTRACT
The article is structured as follows. I begin by briefly addressing some of the definitional and classificatory issues raised by attempts to delimit cybercrime as a distinctive form of criminal endeavour. I then explicate the formulation of routine activity theory that is utilized in the article, and offer some general reflections on some of the pressing issues typically raised vis-a-vis the theory's explanatory ambit (in particular its relation to dispositional or motivational criminologies, and the vexed problem of the 'rationality' or otherwise of offenders' choices to engage in law-breaking behaviour). In the third section, I examine cybercrime in relation to the general ecological presuppositions of RAT, focusing specifically on whether or not the theory's explanatory dependence on spatial and temporal
convergence is transposable to crimes commissioned in online or 'virtual' environments. After considering in a more detailed manner the viability of Felson et al.'s conceptualization of 'target suitability' in relation to the presence of persons and property in virtual environments, I engage in a similar examination of issues related to 'capable guardianship'. In conclusion, I offer some comments on the extent to which cybercrimes might be deemed continuous with 'terrestrial crimes'. SubstantivelY' I suggest that, although the core concepts of RAT are in significant degree transposable (or at least adaptable) to crimes in virtual environments, there remain some qualitative differences between virtual and terrestrial worlds that make a simple, wholesale application of its analytical framework problematic.
