ABSTRACT
This chapter addresses the six responsibilities that should be assigned to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in relation to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). A mixture of plutonium and uranium could be separated to recover the Pu for use in nuclear weapons, but that would require another process stage, which could provide another possible opportunity for detection. Most important is the fact that despite decades of massive investment, the use of plutonium to fuel nuclear reactors has at best been marginally successful—technologically or economically. A nuclear-armed State could intentionally make the plutonium as difficult to process as possible and then isolate it from the biosphere so that it would be impossible or at least extremely difficult to recover. The TPNW Parties should consider how plutonium should be dispositioned under the intention that no one should be able to extract the plutonium after that, and perhaps request the IAEA to develop the necessary ways and means.
