ABSTRACT
A tentative formulation of the agency view is offered, according to which the value constituted by persons’ rights belongs to them because of their agency, and say something briefly about how it relates to other views in the literature, and also about which rights it is intended to cover and why. The notion of agency used in formulating the agency view is then explained. The formulation used is pretty standard, inspired by James Griffin, according to which agency is the capacity to choose and pursue one’s conception of a worthwhile life. It is argued that the agency view implies that all agents have the same value and the question of how to reconcile that finding with the (supposed) fact that not all right holders have the same basic rights is addressed. Against the worry that the agency view implies that non-agents, and notably animals, cannot have rights, it is argued that the disagreement over animal rights is largely verbal. (However, the more complicated issue of children’s rights is passed over).
