ABSTRACT
The ontological question is often formulated by Tillich as a question about the meaning of the verb 'to be'. I shall try to show, in this chapter and the next, how this formulation of the ontological question is linked in Tillich's mind both with the view that the ontologist's task is to describe the most general features of the things which 'are' and with the view that it is his task to account for the fact that there is a world at all. In both cases I shall try to formulate the assumptions, conscious and unconscious, which enable Tillich to further specify what appears to be a merely conceptual question in ways which make it intelligible, even if not defensible, for him to regard the question as calling for an ontological answer. It should be emphasised at the outset not only that Tillich does not consciously separate these two strands in his thought, but also that their confusion is rendered the easier by the fact that in the final outcome the ontologist must set about doing the same thing whether it is the descriptive or the explanatory ontological question that he takes himself to be tackling.
