ABSTRACT
The 'shock of nonbeing' is occasioned, according to Tillich, by recognition of the 'mystery of being'—where the 'mystery of being' consists in the fact 'that there is something and not nothing'. Now if it is the recognition of the 'mystery of being'—where this is constituted by the fact that there is something and not nothing—which occasions the 'shock of nonbeing', the experience of this shock must not be confused with the experience of 'anxiety'. A link between accounting for the 'being' of 'what is' and describing the nature of 'what is' can be provided if both of two views are attributed to Tillich. Although the views of Tillich's help to account for his failure to distinguish between ontology qua endeavour to dispel something of the mystery of being and ontology qua endeavour to describe what all beings have in common, they are themselves in grave need of elucidation and defence.
