Th is strategy shift did not imply a complete loss of interest in the Palestine problem or for that matter – abandonment of the desire to see Israel’s eventual demise. However, it did mean that Nasser’s dealing with post-June 1967 Israel held primacy over “1948 Israel.” To be sure, some of Nasser’s rhetoric appeared ambiguous, avoiding advocacy of Israel’s destruction while remaining unwavering in his solidarity with the Palestinians.2 He pragmatically acknowledged that destroying Israel would pose a far more diffi cult task than regaining the 1967 territories. Th erefore, he had begun spending considerably less time on the Palestinian cause, focusing fi rst and foremost on the more immediate Egyptian goal of regaining Sinai. Gradually, he began adopting this new approach whereby he would limit or altogether abandon eff orts to reverse the 1948 Nakba and focus primarily on regaining Arab territory lost during the 1967 Naksa.