ABSTRACT
This chapter expresses that the poverty trap appeared in the second period of the Angolan Civil War to hamper UNITA's progression from guerrilla to conventional warfare. A longitudinal survey of UNITA's troop strength clearly indicates the influence of the poverty trap. UNITA's relative growth was estimated by dividing its troop strength by those of the size of the MPLA/Cuban forces. The poverty trap in warfare conversion only affects belligerents attempting to make the transition from a guerrilla to a conventional strategy. The chapter deals with uncovering the effect of foreign intervention on warfare when a poverty trap is present. Empirically, this is achieved by examining the second period of the Angolan Civil War. The second period experienced two distinct patterns in foreign intervention. The chapter also expresses that changes in foreign intervention overtime could be instrumental in allowing belligerents to overcome the poverty trap and convert to a conventional strategy.
