ABSTRACT
The attempt to erect into substantial entities not merely our inner perceptions themselves, but even the various aspects which they offer to our conceptual thought, has nowhere wrought more confusion than in the conception of will. The chapter shows that an affective motive is the indispensable antecedent of the voluntary act, it is natural to assume that the causal determination of will is wholly comprehended in this relation to the feelings that precede or accompany volition. All motives are impulsive in character. Each one of them, acting alone, would be an irresistible impulse; in combination they form impulsive forces, which react upon one another, and determine the will in such a way that it follows the predominant motives. The distinguishing mark of moral responsibility is the causality of character. Constraint in its two forms can do no more than produce the outward symptoms of morality; or at best a feeling of repugnance, the product of habit, towards what is immoral.
