ABSTRACT

Under all circumstances the antinomy itself is rightly regarded as genuine. One can most easily bring it home to the sense of value if, abandoning the more exact but difficult modal terminology, one formulates it in the following manner. The several propositions hold good also for disvalues, with the opposite designations: the reality and the realization of disvalues are contrary to value, the non-actuality and the annihilation of disvalues are valuable. Parallel to the first antinomy, but not coincident with it, stands a second, equally fundamental. It is of the essence of the ought to force itself onward into reality. Modal analysis of the Ought has shown that a kind of necessity inheres in the mode of existence peculiar to what ought to be—therefore peculiar to values. Acts to which moral value adheres are only made possible through the absence of power on the part of the unconditional necessity of the Ought.