ABSTRACT
Difference between conventional and nuclear strategy lies in the changed relationship between deterrent forces and defense forces. In the United States, civilian academic circles have entered the field of nuclear strategy and are trying their hand in the elaboration of its problems. The complexities and implications of the concept of deterrence have fascinated the professors as a subject for deliberation, discourse, and disputation. Deterrence being a general human activity, and not necessarily military, analogies have been drawn and generalizations derived from the extensive and varied phenomena of every-day life. The possibility of testing doctrines of nuclear war has become even more remote; nuclear strategy will always bear the nature of conjecture without the possibility of actual corroboration. The approach of academic theorists to strategic studies may appear at a high level of abstraction to be dealing with models and 'ideal types'. Many of their ideas seem to be over-sophistications of remote contingencies, whose materialization in reality is difficult to envisage.
