ABSTRACT
This chapter considers that the effect of threat or danger of escalation has on the negotiation and settlement of low-level crises and disagreements, and the influence such crises and disagreements can have on further escalation. Such situations and tactics are included in the first three rungs of the ladder: ostensible crisis; political, economic, and diplomatic gestures; and solemn and formal declarations. Political and military gestures can be part of an escalation process and still be justified or motivated for reasons other than escalation. The possibility of such pre-emptive escalation falls into the general category of "rationality-of-irrationality" and "committal" strategies. The chapter discusses that the particular ladder considered here is in some senses an American rather than a Soviet ladder. One of the most interesting examples of subcrisis maneuvering was the series of leaks and announcements issued by US, Chinese, and North and South Vietnamese leaders in the summer of 1964.
