ABSTRACT
In May 1967 Egypt violated two of the tacit agreements which had provided the basis for the status quo between Israel and Egypt since 1957: it concentrated forces in the Sinai Desert near the cease fire line with Israel (at the same time expelling the UN Emergency Force stationed there as part of the 1957 settlement for Israeli withdrawal), and it closed the Straits of Tiran. From the Israeli perspective, each of these acts constituted a casus belli.* On 5 June Israel attacked the Egyptian forces in the Sinai and in Egypt itself. On the same day, Jordan and Syria entered the war in support of Egypt. The results of the war are well known. Israel defeated the three Arab states in what became known as the Six-Day War, and gained control of the Sinai Peninsula, the west bank of the Jordan, and the Syrian Golan Heights. As a consequence, Israel controlled additional territories totalling about 26,158 square miles, including about 23,166 square miles in the Sinai Desert-an area more than three times as large as its total territory prior to the 1967 War. Israel immediately annexed the eastern part of Jerusalem and uni fied the dty, which had been divided since 1949. Along with the additional territories, more than a million Arabs fell under Israel’s administration, t
The acquisition of these extensive territories had not been anticipated, and stemmed in part from the war’s outcome and in part from a constellation of international circumstances favorable to the Israelis. Israeli society adjusted very rapidly to the new situa tion, which significantly enhanced its self-image and had far-reaching effects on its actions in various spheres and many different direc tions. The purpose of this chapter is, inter alia, to describe the pro cess of adjustment to the new situation and analyze some of its effects. We will discuss how the situation was perceived by various social and political groups, how it affected the struggles among them, and how these struggles influenced the Arab-Israeli conflict.
