ABSTRACT
G. E. Moore erected the Naturalistic Fallacy into the idol of his daemonology, feeling that it was something bad but being unable to get clear in his mind as to what it consisted in. Fallacies and confusions round one core of objects may be many, but how far they are, or why they must be, 'naturalistic' Moore himself doubts. To identify moral goodness with one such standard moral quality – justice or love of one's neighbour – is one-sided, arbitrary and misleading, but not at all a 'Naturalistic Fallacy'. Moore's positive concepts for an 'ideal', instances of Good, such as aesthetic enjoyments, personal affections, and cognition of things good, obviously stand much more loosely to moral themes in the proper sense of the word. Moral imperatives and moral conscience trench and intrude upon this basic natural bent; it is not the principle of morality.
