ABSTRACT
The tenth anniversary of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait–an “unexpected” event that led directly to the “victorious” Gulf War–is more than just a memory. Iraq is gearing up for a replay–and nobody is paying much attention. Saddam Hussein is reconstituting his capability to deploy weapons of mass destruction, even taking steps to reassemble his nuclear weapons design team. After waging a brilliant military campaign, Washington did not carry the mission through to either destroying Saddam Hussein or truly castrating his power. But it could have meant bringing Saddam to southern Iraq to take the humiliation of the defeat, not allowing him to fly his helicopters. It showed that the United States is historically good at all-out war, but that it is not good at Machiavellian planning or at persisting to the end. The United States seems to be deeply mired, whether in the Balkans or in Iraq, in the ambiguous “victories” of the new resolutionless wars.
