ABSTRACT
Mikhail Gorbachev practices the diplomacy of the unexpected. The results of his diplomacy were politically sustainable at home primarily because, after decades of overly ambitious, extremely costly, and largely failed foreign policy undertakings. There is considerable evidence that Gorbachev views his own predicament in the terms—as a search for ways of dealing with decline. Gorbachev is not alone in his reading of the Soviet Union's situation; it appears to be shared by the entire group of leaders that came to power with the passing of the Brezhnev generation. The Soviet war effort in Afghanistan has emerged as the outstanding example of failure and retreat under Gorbachev. The precedents suggest that Gorbachev, coming to power against the very difficult background of North Atlantic Treaty Organization's intermediate-range nuclear forces deployments and the war in Afghanistan, was highly likely to pursue a detente with the United States.
