ABSTRACT
The idea of a 'pure intellect', interpreted as a 'faculty' of pure thought and completely detached from every 'faculty of sensibility', could only be conceived before an elementary analysis of knowledge. The acts of simple intuition were called sensuous, and the founded acts, directly or indirectly leading back to sense perception, categorial. Within the sphere of categorial acts, it is important to distinguish between pure categorial acts, acts of the 'pure understanding', and mixed acts of the understanding, 'dealing' with sense perception. The use of the term 'phenomenon' is to designate the appearing objects and properties at one time, or at another time the experiences constituting the act of appearance. And finally all experiences in general, as phenomena, explain the temptation to jumble together two essentially different psychological kinds of division of 'phenomena': Divisions of the experiences; and Division of the phenomenal objects.
