ABSTRACT
After the institutionalization of the independent regulatory commissions in the 1930s, the US administrative state went through further judicialization, owing to the attempt by conservative lawyers at the American Bar Association, which resulted in the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946. The statute, applicable to all administrative agencies, provided for formal adjudication and hearing examiners (later renamed administrative law judges) who adjudicate on behalf of agency heads. The administrative state, however, has become considerably dejudicialized since the mid-twentieth century; administrative procedures became more informal, quasi-judicial adjudication was replaced by quasi-legislative rulemaking, and independent commissions lost their status as the representative regulatory agencies. The change was caused by exponential growth of government workload and criticisms against the bias and ineffectiveness of courtlike procedures. Still, the independent regulatory commissions retain their autonomy from the president, and the US administrative state remains highly judicialized in comparison to other jurisdictions. The conclusion closes the book by explaining the lasting impact of the judicialized US state organized around independent regulatory commissions, which have been widely adopted around the world since the late twentieth century.
