ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on China and its Mekong hydro-politics, which was extremely challenged by the spring 2010 events. It also focuses on China's response to the criticism it had to face during the spring 2010 Mekong crisis. The first phase of China's response to downstream criticism was clearly characterized by ignoring the blame. The Chinese state-owned media did just not pick up on the blame Chinese dams received by various voices coming from out of the Mekong downstream riparian countries and solely covered the situation from a domestic drought perspective. In securitization theory terminology, China became a blocker audience that no longer remains silent, but becomes vocal in order to turn down securitization moves. In that sense, and viewed through the prism of securitization theory, China shifted from being a blocker audience to incoming securitization moves to becoming an at least cautious re-shaper of these moves.
