ABSTRACT
This chapter begins by revisiting a recent objection that Chalmers developed against the dynamic entanglement and unique temporal signature (DEUTS) argument for extended consciousness. The DEUTS argument is premised on the dynamic entanglement between internal and external processes, which arises out of tight couplings between perception and action. The chapter shows how Chalmers’s common-sense criteria for demarcating the boundaries of the mind finds some support in recent work on predictive processing. In living systems, the Markov blanket allows for a statistical partitioning of internal states from external states via a third set of states: active and sensory states. This means that a Markov blanket both segregates internal and external states and couples them through active and sensory states. The Markov blanket concept escapes these problems. It provides a statistical partitionioning of internal and external states given a third set of states rendering internal and external states conditionally independent of one another.
