ABSTRACT
In this chapter the author introduces the notion of metaphysical grounding as a robust form of metaphysical dependence as well as several general background assumptions about grounding that he draw from in the sequel. The chapter explicates a host of axioms and operative assumptions about the formal and structural features of a species of grounding, viz. ontological dependence, that is ubiquitous in the context of mereological metaphysics. It aims to get before us a specific class of grounding concepts that are sufficient to provide the requisite metaphysical underpinning for answering the question of fundamental mereology, whether wholes or their parts are metaphysically prior. The chapter takes a closer look at the diverse family of ontological dependence relations. The author employs the serious-essentialist framework to specify a species of grounding that employs a non-modal view of essence and that is well suited to generate relations of metaphysical priority and posteriority.
